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NOTES
THE DIPLOMA DILEMMA: AN INEQUITABLE RESULT
UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBU-
TION STATUTE-Kuder v. Schroeder
I. INTRODUCTION
Many individuals, attempting to make themselves more
attractive in the job market, are deciding to further their educa-
tional studies and seek a professional degree. Often, rather than
put their lives on hold, these degree-seeking candidates decide to
marry and have their spouse support them through school. The
supporting spouse agrees to this condition expecting increased
earning potential for the student, and thus, a better financial
future for the family. Increasingly, however, once the student
spouse receives a degree, he or she decides to leave the marriage.
This situation, described by the Ohio Supreme Court as the
"diploma dilemma,"' has created problems for courts in deciding
how to compensate the efforts and investment of the supporting
spouse. These problems arise since neither existing case law nor
statutes lend assistance to courts in developing a remedy, with the
primarily obstacle being that this factual scenario is frequently
overlooked and not specifically addressed by the legislature. As a
result, courts addressing this situation have tried to fashion a
multitude of different approaches to alleviate the harsh conse-
quences of this predicament.
The results of this factual scenario and predictament, there-
fore, can be both inequitable and devastating to a supporting
spouse who has given up opportunities to support his or her stu-
dent spouse through school with the expectation that following the
student spouse's graduation, certain circumstances will follow.2
For example, many women either forego career opportunities or
1. Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131, 132 (Ohio 1986).
2. Although the common situation involves a wife who supported her
husband through school, the problems and remedies discussed in this Note apply
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postpone child-bearing, or both, until the husband's education is
complete, often to discover that these opportunities will never be
realized since their marriage is over.
Typically, a marital unit does not put into writing their expec-
tations, but simply informally and orally agree that one spouse
will support the other until the degree is obtained, at which time
the former student spouse, now degree-holder, will support the
former supporting spouse while he or she either rears the family
or pursues his or her own interests. This type of problem
appeared before the Michigan Court of Appeals in Woodworth v.
Woodworth.3 Mr. and Mrs. Woodworth had been married for
three years when Mr. Woodworth decided to attend law school.4
Mrs. Woodworth supported the family during Mr. Woodworth's
law school career, but four years after Mr. Woodworth graduated
the marriage ended.5 The facts of the case indicated that Mr.
Woodworth's law degree was the end product of a "concerted fam-
ily effort" and that both Mr. and Mrs. Woodworth had planned
their family lives around the attainment of the degree.6 After
expending both considerable time and money in pursuit of the
"paper chase,"7 Mrs. Woodworth had few marital assets after the
divorce and she did not qualify for alimony. Mr. Woodworth, on
the other hand, had a greatly enhanced earning potential, due in
large part to Mrs. Woodworth's efforts.
The Michigan Court of Appeals fashioned a remedy under
equitable distribution principles and considered the law degree to
be martial property, subject to division.' The Woodworth decision
is considered the severe minority view and it has not been fol-
lowed by many courts even though these cases and factual scena-
rios inspire significant judicial sympathy. North Carolina,
recently in Kuder v. Schroeder,9 decided to adopt the majority
view and not follow Woodworth, although the court did not specifi-
equally to the situation where a husband supports his wife through professional
school.
3. 337 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 333.
6. Id. at 334.
7. Id.
8. Id. Compare Krause v. Krause, 441 N.W.2d 66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding degree is not property) and Olah v. Olah, 354 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984) (same) with Postema v. Postema, 471 N.W.2d 912 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991) (holding law degree is property).
9. 110 N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (1993).
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cally address the exemption of a professional degree from marital
property available for distribution.
This Note addresses the rationale of the North Carolina Court
of Appeals in Kuder, as well as alternative remedies relied on by
other courts which could help avoid the unjust effects of the Kuder
decision. In addition, this Note analyzes how other jurisdictions
have handled similar cases and if those methods would be applica-
ble and proper in North Carolina. Finally, this Note suggests how
attorneys and supporting spouses can avoid the consequences that
will follow as a result of the Kuder decision.
II. THE CASE
In Kuder, the plaintiff wife, who was a veterinarian, provided
total financial support for the family.10 At the time of their mar-
riage, both Mr. Schroeder, the defendant husband, and Mrs.
Kuder agreed that Mrs. Kuder would continue her teaching job at
a local community college while Mr. Schroeder returned to school
full-time to get his undergraduate degree.11 Mrs. Kuder also
agreed that she would have only one child while Mr. Schroeder
was in school.12 Mr. Schroeder agreed that once he finished his
undergraduate studies, he would provide the entire financial sup-
port for the family and Mrs. Kuder could realize her plans to
become a full-time wife and mother.13 With this expectation in
mind, Mrs. Kuder supported Mr. Schroeder and their one child
throughout Mr. Schroeder's undergraduate education.' 4
After Mr. Schroeder finished his undergraduate studies, he
decided that he wanted to pursue a Master's degree. The parties
amended their agreement to allow him time to do so.15 After two
years, however, Mr. Schroeder changed his mind about his
Master's degree and instead decided to pursue a law degree.' 6
Once again, Mrs. Kuder and Mr. Schroeder modified their agree-
ment to give Mr. Schroeder time to continue his law studies.' 7
During this time Mrs. Kuder continued to provide all the income
10. Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 358, 430 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1993).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 359, 430 S.E.2d at 274.
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for the family."' For the first two years after graduating from law
school, Mr. Schroeder did not earn enough money to support the
family.' 9 Finally Mr. Schroeder did attain a position with a law
firm in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he earned enough to pro-
vide the total financial support for the family. Three months
later, however, Mr. Schoreder told Mrs. Kuder he no longer loved
her and he left.2 °
Mrs. Kuder brought an action against Mr. Schroeder for
divorce, and she also asserted claims for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment and punitive damages. The district court granted a
motion to dismiss in favor of Mr. Schroeder,21 and Mrs. Kuder
appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
holding that Mrs. Kuder did not state a claim for breach of con-
tract or unjust enrichment.22 The court, although expressing sym-
pathy for Mrs. Kuder, stated that there is no support in the laws
of the State of North Carolina for her claims.2 3 The court of
appeals based its decision on the common-law rule in North Caro-
lina that "there is a personal duty of each spouse to support the
other, a duty arising from the marital relationship, and carrying
with it the corollary right to support from the other spouse."24
Furthermore, the court indicated that as long as the marriage
endures, the duty to support cannot be abrogated or modified by
an agreement of the parties.25
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Professional Degree as Marital Property
Many of the initial lawsuits, brought by spouses under fact
patterns similar to Kuder, sought to have professional degrees
declared marital property and, thus, available for distribution
upon divorce. O'Brien v. O'Brien26 is the leading case in this area.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (1990); Harris v. Duke Power
Co., 83 N.C. App. 195, 349 S.E.2d 394 (1986), aff'd, 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357
(1987).
22. Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (1993).
23. Id. at 357, 430 S.E.2d at 273.
24. Id. at 357. See North Carolina Baptist Hosp. v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354
S.E.2d 471 (1987).
25. Id. See generally ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILy LAw, §§ 16.4,
at 183 (4th ed. 1980).
26. 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
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In O'Brien, the New York Court of Appeals determined that a
spouse's professional license constituted marital property subject
to equitable distribution27 under New York's Equitable Distribu-
tion Law.2" As a result of O'Brien, New York is the only jurisdic-
tion whose state supreme court has declared such a degree to be
marital property.2 9
In O'Brien, Dr. O'Brien completed his undergraduate degree
and then, accompanied by his wife, moved to Guadalajara, Mexico,
so he could enroll in medical school.f0 Mrs. O'Brien had chosen to
forego the opportunity to receive her permanent teaching certifi-
cate in New York so that she could move to Mexico with her hus-
band. 31 While in Mexico, Mrs. O'Brien provided approximately
seventy-six percent of the couple's total income. 32 After gradua-
tion, the couple moved back to New York. Four years later, Dr.
O'Brien filed for divorce, two months after receiving his medical
license. 3 At trial, Mrs. O'Brien sought an equitable distribution
of the couple's marital property.34 Mrs. O'Brien presented expert
testimony that the value of Dr. O'Brien's medical license was
$472,000, and the lower court ruled in favor of Mrs. O'Brien.35
The New York Court of Appeals upheld this decision by reasoning
their equitable distribution statute included a professional degree
as marital property.36
In O'Brien the court addressed the common defense that a
degree is not property in the traditional definition of the word
since it cannot be transferred or sold and because it terminates at
the death of the holder. Since equitable distribution statutes were
unknown at common law, the O'Brien court held the definition of
marital property must be ascertained from the language of the
statute itself.37 The court, therefore, held that whether the
27. Id. at 713.
28. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw. § 236(B) (McKinney 1986).
29. See Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949 (Mass. 1987) (New York is the
only jurisdiction where a professional license is considered marital property.).
30. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714.
31. Id.
32. Id. The O'Briens received additional financial help from both spouse's
parents and Mr. O'Brien contributed some proceeds from an educational loan. Id.
33. Id.
34. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
35. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714.
36. Id. at 716.
37. Id. at 717.
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license fits within traditional property concepts is of no conse-
quence.38 Moreover, the court opined:
[F]ew undertakings during a marriage better qualify as the type of
joint effort that the statute's economic partnership theory is
intended to address than contributions toward one spouse's acqui-
sition of a professional license. Working spouses are often
required to contribute substantial income as wage earners, sacri-
fice their own educational or career goals and opportunities for
child rearing, perform the bulk of household duties and responsi-
bilities and forego the acquisition of marital assets that could have
been accumulated if the professional spouse had been employed
rather than occupied with the study and training necessary to
acquire a professional license.39
Although the New York court seemed to reach an equitable
result in this case, O'Brien, as mentioned previously, is the only
case in which a state supreme court has declared a professional
degree to be marital property subject to division.40 The Michigan
Court of Appeals, in Woodworth v. Woodworth, 4' held that a law
degree was a divisible marital asset; the Michigan Supreme
Court, however, has not addressed the issue and the Michigan
Court of Appeals' decision has been questioned.42
Most jurisdictions defend their refusal to allow a professional
degree to be considered marital property based on the traditional
38. Id.
39. Id. at 716.
40. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding law degree not marital asset); In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75,
77 (Colo. 1978) (holding M.B.A. not marital asset); In re Marriage of McVey, 641
P.2d 300, 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding graduate degree not divisible); In re
Marriage of Rubinstein, 495 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding medical
degree not marital asset); In re Marriage of McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 372
(Ind. 1980) (holding law degree not marital asset); Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d
329, 333 (Ky. 1985) (holding medical degree not marital asset); Archer v. Archer,
493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (Md. 1985) (holding medical degree not marital asset); In re
Marriage of Dusing, 654 S.W.2d 938, 946 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding medical
degree not marital asset); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1982)
(holding M.B.A. not marital asset); Hodge v. Hodge, 486 A.2d 951, 953 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984) (holding medical degree not divisible marital asset); In re
Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Wis. 1982) (holding medical degree
not marital asset).
41. 337 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); See supra note 3.
42. See, e.g., Olah v. Olah, 354 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
medical degree not divisible marital asset).
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definition of property.4" As the court in In re Marriage of Gra-
ham44 stated:
An educational degree ... is simply not encompassed even by the
broad views of the concept of "property." It does not have an
exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open
market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on the death of
the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold,
transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumu-
lative product of many years of previous education, combined with
diligence and hard work ... In our view, it has none of the attrib-
utes of property in the usual sense of that term. 4
Even though New York courts articulated formulas for the divi-
sion of professional degrees as marital property, the clear trend in
every other jurisdiction is away from this type of classification.46
B. The Professional License in a Marital Contract
Another recovery theory relied on by some supporting
spouses, as in Kuder,47 is based on contract principles. The sup-
porting spouse can allege that he or she and his or her student
spouse entered into a contract, either before or during marriage,
that the supporting spouse would support the student spouse
while he or she pursues his or her education; and in return, the
student spouse would, after graduation, support the previous sup-
porting spouse, either in his or her pursuit of education, career
opportunities, or child-bearing.
Courts often recognize contracts governing a marriage, most
notably in pre-nuptial agreements. Pre-nuptial agreements, how-
ever, are rare, and even more rare are express contracts between
43. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Graham v.
Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074 (Md. 1985); Olah v. Olah, 354
N.W.2d 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); see generally Michael G. Walsh, Annotation,
Spouse's Professional Degree or License as Marital Property for Purposes of
Alimony, Support, or Property Settlement, 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294 (1981 & Supp.
1994).
44. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
45. Id. at 77.
46. See generally Daniel E. Burke, Comment, 'Til Graduation Do We Part-
The Professional Degree Acquired During Marriage as Marital Property Upon
Dissolution: An Evaluation and Recommendation for Ohio, 56 U. CIN. L. REV.
227 (1987); Timothy S. Harris, Note, Do Professional Degrees and Licenses
Earned During Marriage Constitute Marital Property?: An Irrelevant Issue, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 1171 (1987); Walsh, supra note 43.
47. Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (1993).
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the spouses governing conduct in the marriage.4" Courts do imply
some obligations in marriages. Normally though, as in any con-
tract situation, the aggrieved spouse must prove the other spouse
breached this implied contract.
The majority of these contract claims fail because a contract
between spouses, even an implied contract, often lacks the essen-
tial requisites to form a contract. As Judge Greene pointed out in
his dissent in Kuder, "an agreement which is not reasonably cer-
tain as to its material terms is indefinite and will not be-because
it cannot be-enforced by our courts."4 9 In Kuder, there was
neither a time limit within which the husband was to complete his
education, a time as to when the wife would assume her duties as
a full-time mother,5 0 an intended duration of the plaintiff's role as
a full-time mother and wife, 51 nor any specific amount of compen-
sation the wife was to pay for the financial support of the family.5 2
Due to these deficiencies, the court could not uphold Mrs. Kuder's
contract claim. A court's function cannot be that of a "contract
maker."5 3 As such, courts cannot imply a contract simply to
accomplish a purported good purpose.54 Since parties in most
marital contexts do not agree to specific terms, the majority of
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue-like North Caro-
lina-do not grant relief based on contract principles. 55
C. The Professional License and Alimony
Some supporting spouses bring claims under traditional ali-
mony or maintenance standards in trying to ascertain and trans-
fer the value of a professional degree. These claims, often like
contract claims, have met with little success. In the minority of
cases allowing recovery to the supporting spouse after considering
48. Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1989).
49. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 360, 430 S.E.2d at 274 (Greene, J., dissenting)
(citing Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1981);
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS, § 2-9 (3d ed.
1987)).
50. Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 361, 430 S.E.2d 271, 275 (1993).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d at 201.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). For cases
denying the supporting spouse recovery under the theory that the professional
degree is a marital asset, see supra note 40.
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the professional degree, 56 no uniform method of valuing the
degree has developed.
Although an attractive remedy for some judges attempting to
avoid the inequitable result of giving the supporting spouse little
after he or she has supported his or her student spouse for years,
the traditional requirements of alimony preclude most supporting
spouses from succeeding under this theory. A significant group of
modern statutes require spouses who seek support awards to
establish either need, dependence, or incapacitation.5 7 These
requirements are often impossible to show since in the typical fact
pattern, the spouse seeking support is the one who has been sup-
porting. As a result, the supporting spouse has proven already
that he or she can be self-reliant and does not need financial
support.-5
There also are inadequacies under the alimony theory of
recovery. As one commentator suggested an award of alimony
engenders dependence of one spouse on his or her former spouse
and prolongs a relationship that no longer legally exists.5 9 Addi-
tionally, an award of alimony is a discretionary remedy, depen-
dent on a judge and how he or she views the circumstances. As
such, a judge may decide arbitrarily to award only a nominal
SUMn.
6 0
Other courts have fashioned an equitable remedy under the
auspice of alimony, called "reimbursement alimony."61 This type
56. See, e.g., Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Md. 1985) (awarding
alimony of one hundred dollars per month for twelve months); In re Marriage of
Goldstein, 423 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (awarding maintenance of
two hundred dollars per month for twelve months); Stansberrry v. Stansberry,
580 P.2d 147, 149 (Okla. 1978) (awarding support of five hundred dollars per
month for child).
57. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1512 (b)(2), (3) (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-705.1 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.19 1 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 752(a) (1989).
58. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982). See generally Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28
UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981).
59. Burke, supra note 46, at 237.
60. Id.
61. Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)
(Reimbursement alimony is the return to a supporting spouse for contributions
made for the education of a student spouse.); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527,
534 (N.J. 1982) (same); Reiss v. Reiss, 500 A.2d 24, 25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1985) (same).
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of alimony is designed to recompense supporting spouses for "all
financial contributions towards the former spouse's education,
including[, but not limited too,] household expenses, educational
costs, school travel expenses and any other contributions used by
the supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license."62
IV. ANALYSIS
In Kuder v. Schroeder, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
refused to allow a wife who had supported her husband through-
out law school to recover under either a contract theory or unjust
enrichment.63 The court, instead, in its brief opinion, reasoned
under the traditional view, that each spouse has a duty to support
the other and this duty cannot be modified or abrogated by either
party.6 4 In doing so, the Kuder court failed to strike an equitable
result for Mrs. Kuder. Indeed, the Kuder decision may have the
potential to change the way men and women enter into relation-
ships when one of them pursues an advanced degree based on
assurances of the other's support, yet the North Carolina Court of
Appeals failed to take the opportunity to remedy what is becoming
an increasing problem for young couples. Moreover, the Kuder
decision did not provide a just solution and provides little hope for
future supporting partners to recover from their enormous
investment.
Since the Kuder court decided the issue based on the duty of
each spouse to support each other, there was no need for the court
to specifically address Mrs. Kuder's contract or unjust enrichment
claims. The court, however, probably would have been correct,
and in agreement with the majority of jurisdictions, 5 in refusing
to honor the agreement in Kuder based on contract principles. As
Judge Greene pointed out in his dissent, even if there was an oral
contract between the parties, it would fail for indefiniteness.6 6 If,
on the other hand, all the requirements of a contract are complied
with, indefiniteness should not close the door on one spouse seek-
ing to enforce such a contract. In fact, due to the result in Kuder,
it is certainly likely that attorneys in North Carolina will now
advise a client who will be entering such a relationship, as the one
62. Mahoney, 435 A.2d at 534; see also Hill v. Hill, 453 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1982);
Lynn v. Lynn, 453 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
63. Id. at 357, 430 S.E.2d at 273.
64. Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (1993).
65. See supra note 55.
66. Id. at 360, 430 S.E.2d at 274-75 (Greene, J., dissenting).
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in Kuder, to outline specifically in a written agreement the duties
each spouse will have to the other. Moreover, attorneys now
should be cautious to address, and actually set forth, Judge
Greene's concerns in Kuder about the specific time period the sup-
ported spouse will continue his or her education, what the sup-
porting spouse desires upon completion of the degree by the
student spouse, how much financial support the supporting
spouse will provide, and the amount the former student spouse
must provide when the parties "switch[ ] breadwinner roles."67
Since North Carolina recognizes the validity of contracts
which modify or abrogate the marital duty of support if such Con-
tracts are entered into before marriage, or upon separation of the
parties, 68 there is no reason why the courts in North Carolina
should not disregard the traditional duty of support in this non-
traditional setting. Moreover, the justifications for realizing such
a contract is even more compelling due to the fact that North Car-
olina would recognize such an agreement between an unmarried
couple. 9 It does not then further the public policy of favoring
marriage when an unmarried, cohabiting partner is entitled to
compensation for the contributions to their partner's education,
while a spouse who contributed the same or more, is not.7 °
Another approach that could be considered in fact patterns of
this type is whether a professional license should be classified as
marital property, subject to division upon dissolution of the mar-
riage. North Carolina recognizes as separate property "[all pro-
fessional licenses and business licenses which would terminate on
transfer."71 Judge Greene suggested that North Carolina courts
at least should recognize as marital property the increase in value
to a professional license due to marital contributions.72 The New
York courts recognize a professional degree as marital property
and allow expert testimony concerning the present value of such a
degree.73 Since the concept of marital property was unknown at
the common law, it is not surprising, and even irrelevant, that
traditional common law concepts of property do not encompass a
67. Id. at 361, 430 S.E.2d at 275.
68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52B-1 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991).
69. Suggs v. Norris, 88 N.C. App. 539, 364 S.E.2d 159, cert. denied, 322 N.C.
486, 370 S.E.2d 236 (1988).
70. See generally Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 360, 430 S.E.2d at 274.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Supp. 1993).
72. Sonek v. Sonek, 105 N.C. App. 247, 254, 412 S.E.2d 917, 922 (1992)
(Greene, J., concurring).
73. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714.
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professional license.74 In addition, North Carolina courts already
have at their discretion the authority to divide marital property
fairly if an equal division of the marital property is not equita-
ble.75 A factor to be considered by the courts in dividing marital
assets is "[a]ny direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse
to help educate or develop the career potential of the other
spouse."76 In construing the North Carolina Equitable Distribu-
tion Statute, however, the court of appeals found the legislative
intent must be to exclude educational degrees from the definition
of marital and separate property. 7
It is interesting to note that at least in one equitable distribu-
tion action prior to Kuder, the court of appeals recognized the
potential inequity that could result in a diploma dilema situa-
tion.78 In Geer v. Geer, the supporting husband gave up his job
and relocated twice to enable his wife to attend medical school.7 9
The Geer court found sufficient evidence in the record that an
equal division of the marital property would be inequitable to the
husband because of "the direct and indirect contributions made by
[him] to help to educate or develop the career potential of [his stu-
dent spouse] and the consequent disparity in the income of [the
wife] at the time of the distribution."80 Although the court consid-
ered the inequalities in Geer, the parties had accumulated suffi-
cient assets which could be distributed. In Kuder, as is often the
case when one spouse is in a graduate program, the parties did not
have sufficient time nor adequate financial resources to accumu-
late any assets which could be distributed in order to offset the
sacrifices of the supporting spouse and the increased earning
potential of the student spouse.
Perhaps the easiest method to compensate the supporting
spouse is to give an equitable award of restitution on the basis of
unjust enrichment. In order to recover on a restitution claim, a
plaintiff must prove: first, the defendant received a benefit; sec-
ond, the benefit must have been given at the plaintiff's expense;
and third, the defendant's retention of the benefit must be
74. Id. at 715.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (Supp. 1993).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (Supp. 1993).
77. Haywood v. Haywood, 106 N.C. App. 91, 100, 415 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1992).
78. Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987).
79. Id. at 474, 353 S.E.2d at 429.
80. Id. at 479, 353 S.E.2d at 432.
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unjust.8 ' Typically, all three elements are present in the profes-
sional degree fact pattern. As the Arizona Court of Appeals recog-
nized, a benefit may be any type of advantage, including one
which saves the recipient from any loss or expense. 2 In Kuder,
without the wife's support, the defendant may not have attended
law school; he may have been forced to prolong his education
because he had to work during his schooling; or he may have gone
deeply into debt.
Some claims of unjust enrichment, however, are denied based
on the general rule that there is no unjustness if the benefit was
conferred with "donative intent."8" Courts who employ this
rationale to defeat restitution claims, seem to be ignoring the fact
that the parties entered into an agreement for the supporting
roles to be reversed after graduation. Though the Arizona Court
of Appeals, like the Kuder court, did not agree that such an agree-
ment rose to the level of a contract, the court, nonetheless, still
considered the agreement important as evidencing the wife's
"expectation of compensation and the circumstances which make
it unjust to allow [the husband] to retain the benefits of her
extraordinary efforts." 4 Clearly, the presence of such an agree-
ment would tend to negate any indication of donative intent.
Another potential remedy the North Carolina courts could use
to help alleviate inequities in cases like Kuder, is "reimbursement
alimony." 5 This concept also helps provide a fair and effective
way to compensate a supporting spouse who has suffered a "loss or
reduction of support, or has incurred a lower standard of living, or
has been deprived of a better standard of living in the future
..... At a minimum, this type of remedy compensates a sup-
porting spouse for actual costs he or she incurred in support of the
education, i.e., tuition, books, and fees.
Still other jurisdictions award a wife restitutionary income
under a broader economic theory. In Haugan v. Haugan,7 the
court included in the award, lost earnings of the spouse who was
81. See Ellman, supra note 4, at 25; see generally Casad, Unmarried Couples
and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract and Back Again, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 47, 52 (1978).
82. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d at 202.
.83. See Casad, supra note 81, at 53.
84. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d at 203.
85. See Mahoney, 453 A.2d. at 534.
86. Id.
87. 343 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Wis. 1984).
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educated during the marriage," In others, the award extends to
cover the payments made by the supporting spouse for the edu-
cated partner's living expenses.8 9 Each of these remedies are
examples of efforts by courts to limit a supported spouse from
receiving a windfall of an increased earning capacity at the
expense of a spouse who has "devoted much of the product of sev-
eral years labor to an 'investment' in future family prosperity..."
and who will receive no return of this investment.90 A mathemati-
cal formula has even been adopted in one jurisdiction, which will
give uniformity and predictability for future courts trying to rem-
edy these inequitable results.91
CONCLUSION
As more individuals decide to further their education beyond
an undergraduate degree, the diploma dilemma is certain to arise
in the court system more frequently. Until the legislature specifi-
cally addresses this issue by statutory reform, it will be the judici-
ary's responsibility to alleviate the drastic inequities which result
from strict, traditional statutory analysis. The North Carolina
courts should follow those jurisdictions which have fashioned rem-
edies in favor of the supporting spouse in order to allow at least
some measure of recovery to compensate this investment of both
time and money. In these cases, "equity demands that courts seek
extraordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice."92
W. Greg Merritt
88. Id.
89. Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
90. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d at 205.
91. DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981) (working
spouse's financial contributions to joint living expenses and educational costs of
student spouse less one-half (working spouse's financial contributions plus
student spouse's financial contributions less cost of education) equals equitable
award to working spouse). Id.
92. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting).
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